ABSTRACT As the progress of digitization in industrial society, large amount of production data are outsourced to the cloud server in order to reduce data management costs. Nevertheless, how to ensure the outsourced data integrality, validity, and availability is a challenging research topic. Recently, Zhang et al. (IEEE Trans. Industrial Informatic, doi:10.1109/TII.2019 presented an efficient and robust certificateless signature scheme to achieve the data authenticity for industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environments. However, we found that their scheme is insecure. In this paper, we show that an attacker with replacing public key ability can easily impersonate other legitimate users to upload some false messages by forging the target users' valid signatures on these messages. Therefore, their certificateless signature scheme has not solved the IIoT data authenticity issue pointed out by them. Meanwhile, we also demonstrate that their security proof is not sound because the ability of an adversary cannot be applied to solve the difficult problem that they expect.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an emerging trend for various industries and sectors, more and more IIoT data are sourced to the cloud server in order to reduce data management costs ( Figure 1 ). Various sensor devices collect information during industrial outturn and transmit these IIoT data to the cloud server over the Internet [1] , [2] . For security reasons, prior to store or utilize any IIoT data, the data item is required to be checked and only authentic data are used in the IIoT systems.
The signature-based cryptosystem is an important technique to provide data authenticity [3] - [5] . A number of digital signature schemes are proposed to ensure data authenticity in practical. Amongst these digital signature schemes, certificateless signature (CLS) schemes [6] have attracted a lot of attention, because they can overcome the key escrow problem in identity-based systems [7] and the certificate management problem in traditional public key systems.
In 2018, Karati et al. [8] applied their CLS scheme to the IIoT network. Figure 2 shows the network model of
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Noor Zaman. CLS for the IIoT data authenticity. Unfortunately, Zhang et al. [9] pointed out that Karati et al. ' s concrete scheme cannot resist public key replacement attack and known message attack. Recently, Zhang et al. [10] showed a more comprehensive security analysis to [8] and proposed an improved scheme.
In [10] , the authors attempt to provide an efficient and robust solution of data authenticity deficiency in the IIoT network. In this paper, however, our analysis reveals that their scheme cannot withstand public key replacement attacks. We introduce an attack to show that an adversary can forge a valid signature on any message under the new public key chosen by the adversary. In general, the attacker can easily forge the legal user identity (by forging the user's valid signature) to upload any information to the cloud server.
A. RELATED WORK
In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson introduced the concept of certificateless signatures [6] . In 2007, Huang et al. [11] refined its security model according to potential attackers' power. Afterthat, many concrete CLS schemes [12] - [20] were designed and their security were discussed in random oracle model (ROM). However, it is all known that instantiating ROM with real hash functions may cause these original schemes insecure [21] . In 2007, Liu et al. [22] constructed the first concrete CLS scheme secure proven in the standard model. To date, many concrete constructions [23] - [31] without random oracles were introduced to improve the seminal work [22] . Unfortunately, those schemes in [22] - [24] cannot resist public key replacement attack [32] . The scheme in [25] fails to both the public key replacement attack and malicious-but-passive key generation center (KGC) attack [31] . The schemes [26] , [27] , [31] do not give a formal security proof to their scheme in the standard model. The scheme [28] - [30] are proven secure in the standard model but the computation efficiency of those schemes is very low. In 2018, Karati et al. [1] proposed a lightweight CLS scheme in the standard model. In [9] and [10] , the authors pointed out that Karati et al.'s scheme cannot achieve their claimed security properties, respectively. In addition, Zhang et al. gave an efficient and robust CLS scheme for IIoT environments in [10] . However, we will demonstrate the scheme is still subjected to some security issues.
The paper is organized as follows. We firstly give some preliminaries in Section II. Then, we review Zhang et al. ' s certificateless signature and conduct our cryptanalysis on it in Section III. The conclusion is presented in Section IV.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In our work, we use the standard terminology about bilinear pairings, complexity assumptions, certificateless signature and its security model defined in [10] , [28] .
A. BILINEAR PAIRINGS AND COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTION
Let G 1 be an additive cyclic group and G 2 be a multiplicative cyclic group, which are with the same prime order q. Here, P denotes a generator of G 1 . The bilinear mapê : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 has the following properties:
• Bilinearity: ∀P, Q ∈ G 1 and ∀a, b ∈ Z * p , we havê e(aP, bQ) =ê(P, Q) ab ;
• Non-degenracy:ê(P, P) = 1 G 2 where 1 G 2 is the identity element of G 2 ;
• Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to computeê(P, Q).
q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) Assumption: Given G 1 , P, xP, x 2 P, . . . , x q P , the q-SDH problem is to compute a tuple k,
If the q-SDH problem cannot be solved by any algorithm in polynomial time, the q-SDH assumption holds.
B. FRAMEWORK AND SECURITY MODEL
The seven algorithms below which can be run in polynomial time comprise a certificateless signature scheme:
• Setup(κ) On receiving a security parameter κ, the algorithm returns a master secret key msk and system public parameters params. Note that, params is available for all the other algorithms.
• Set-User-Secret-Value(params) On receiving the system public parameters params, this algorithm returns the secret value usv u chosen by an user u and the corresponding user public key upk u .
• Set-Partial-Private-Key(params, msk, upk u ) On receiving the system public parameters params, the master secret key msk, and the user partial public key upk u , the algorithm returns the partial secret key psk u and the corresponding partial public key ppk u . Note that, ppk u is optional in specific situations.
• Set-Full-Secret-Key(params, usv u , psk u ) On receiving the system public parameters params, the user's secret value usv u and the user's partial private key psk u , this algorithm returns the user's secret key sk u .
• Set-Full-Public-Key(params, upk u , ppk u ) This algorithm returns the public key pk u for the user u, which is based on the user's secret value usv u and the system public parameters params.
• CLS-Sign(params, sk u , m) On receiving the system public parameters params, an user's secret key sk u and a message m, this algorithm returns a signature σ .
• CLS-Verify(params, pk u , m, σ ) On receiving a signature σ , a message m and an user's public key pk u , this algorithm returns either ''VALID'' or ''INVALID'' relying on the signature validity.
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Note that, two types of adversaries are taken into account in the CLS definition. The first is a public key replacement (PKR) attacker who knows the targeted user secret value but cannot request the user partial secret key. The other is a malicious-but-passive KGC (MKGC) attacker that is allowed to set the master secret key and the system public parameters, but cannot know the targeted user secret value. Here, the strong security of a CLS scheme is captured by means of the following games 1 and 2 between a challenger C and an attacker A ∈ {A I , A II }.
Game 1 (for PKR attacker)
• Init: Given a security parameter κ, C invokes Setup to produce the master secret key msk and system public parameters params. params is given to A and msk is kept by itself.
• Queries: In this phase, A runs the following queries adaptively:
Receiving an user u, C invokes Set-Full-PublicKey to obtain the user public key pk u and returns it to A. O rep (u, pk u ): Receiving a new entity public key pk u , C finds and updates the corresponding item for the user u.
Receiving an user u, C invokes Set-PartialPrivate-Key to obtain the user partial secret key psk u and returns it to A. O sk (u): Receiving an user u, C invokes Set-PartialPrivate-Key and Set-User-Secret-Value to obtain the user secret key sk u and returns it to A. Here, C returns ⊥ if the user u has already appeared in O rep (u, pk u ). O sign (u, m). Receiving an user u and a message m, C invokes Set-Partial-Private-Key and Set-User-SecretValue to obtain sk u and then performs CLS-Sign to generate the signature σ for m under sk u . At last, C returns it to A.
• Forgery: A returns (σ * , u * , m * ) and wins if the conditions hold:
Game 2 (for MKGC attacker)
• Setup: C invokes A to initialize the system public/secret parameters (params, msk). Here, to mount an attack more easily, A is allowed to set some trapdoors during the initialization phase.
• Queries: Here, A may request any oracles defined in Game 1, except for O rep (u, pk u ) and O psk (u), in an adaptive manner. Note that it is unreasonable to ask C to respond the signing queries if pk u has been replaced.
• Forgery: A outputs (σ * , u * , m * ) and wins if the conditions hold:
Definition: If the adversaries cannot win the above two games with a non-negligible advantage, in a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT), the signature scheme in certificateless settings is strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF ZHANG ET AL.'s CLS for IIoT
In this section, we briefly review the certificateless signature scheme [10] and show a concrete public key replacement attack on the scheme in detail.
A. REVIEW OF ZHANG ET AL. 's CLS
The CLS scheme is concisely restated by the following seven algorithms:
• Setup(κ) Given a random instance (G 1 , G 2 , q, P) described in Section II, where P is a generator of G 1 , the KGC: -chooses a random element s from Z * p , and computes P 0 = sP and Y = e(P, P) s respectively. -picks three collision-resistant hash functions H 0 :
where l ID is the bit length of a user identity.
-outputs the master secret key msk = s and public parameters
• Set-User-Secret-Value(params): Given params, the user with identity ID i : -chooses a random element x i from Z * p , and computes X i = x i P.
-sets usv i = x i and upk i = X i .
• Set-Partial-Private-Key(params, msk, ID i , upk i ): Given params, msk, ID i , upk i , the KGC: -chooses r i ∈ R Z * p and computes R i = r i P, h 1i = H 1 (ID i X i R i ) and k i = r i + s · h 1i + H 0 (sX i ).
-returns psk i = k i and ppk i = R i in public.
• Set-Full-Secret-Key(params, ID i , usv i , psk i ): Given params, ID i , usv i , upk i , psk i , and ppk i , the user with identity ID i :
-
If it holds, believes that psk i is valid and proceeds. Otherwise, requests a new value from KGC again. -sets its full secret key sk i = x i , d i .
• Set-Full-Public-Key(params, upk i , ppk i ): Upon receiving params, upk i , and ppk i , the user sets and returns pk i = X i , R i as its full public key.
• CLS-Sign(params, ID S , sk S , m): Given params, ID S , sk S and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , the signer with identity ID S :
-sets σ = t, δ and opens (m, σ ) under ID S , pk S . • CLS-Verify(params, ID S , pk S , m, σ ): Given params, ID S , pk S , m and σ , any interested verifier:
If it holds, outputs VALID to indicate that σ is a valid signature. Otherwise, returns INVALID.
B. PUBLIC KEY REPLACEMENT ATTACK
In Figure 3 , we show how a Type I adversary A I forges a valid signature σ of any signer S on any message m under the signer's identity ID S and the new public key pk S set by A I . The detailed public key replacement attack shown in Figure 3 is described below.
• First, A I chooses two random elements a, b ∈ Z * p and sets pk S = X S , R S = aP 0 , bP .
• Then, A I computes h 1S = H 1 (ID S X S R S ) and h 2S = H 2 (m ID S ), where ID S denotes the signer's identity.
• Finally, A I sets t = − h 1S a and computes an implicit value:
Now, A I can easily recover (b + h 2S ) −1 and compute δ = (b + h 2S ) −1 P. Obviously, σ = (t, δ) is a valid forgery on the message m under the new public key pk S = X S , R S of the signer S with the identity ID S since it satisfies the verification equation as follows:
That is, Zhang et al.'s CLS scheme is vulnerable to the public key replacement attack.
C. DRAWBACKS IN ZHANG ET AL. 'S SECURITY PROOF

Drawback 1:
The valid signature σ * = (t * , τ * ) under a new public key (ID * , X i , R i ) forged by A I cannot be used to solve the (q s + 1)-SDH problem in the proof of Theorem 1.
• In Query replace-public-key, given a new tuple (ID i , X i , R i ) from A I , B directly updates the corresponding tuple in L pk and L sk . Hence, A I can replace the preset public key R i =P = αP for the target user ID * with a new value R i from Z * p .
• In Query set-partial-private-key, if A I can provide a valid signature σ * = (t * , τ * ) and
Obviously, the authors doesn't consider the case R i = R i . In other words, if A I gives a valid signature σ * = (t * , τ * ) under a new public key (ID * , X i , R i ), B cannot solve (q s + 1)-SDH problem based on σ * . Drawback 2: The probability that B solves the (q s + 1)-SDH problem is zero in the proof of Theorem 1.
• In Query set-partial-private-key, if c i = 1, B sets R i = P = αP, adds (ID i , −, R i , −, c i ) to L psk and aborts.
• In Forgery, B can recover (τ * ,δ) and succeeds in solving the random instance (P, αP, α 2 P, . . . , α q s +1 P) from (q s + 1)-SDH problem if and only if c i = 1 and σ * is a valid signature provided by A I , where
Obviously, the case c i = 1 in Forgery will never happen because if c i = 1, the simulation has been terminated during Query set-partial-private-key. That is to say, the probability that B solves the (q s + 1)-SDH problem is zero.
Drawback 3: The probability that B solves the (q s + 1)-SDH problem is zero in the proof of Theorem 2.
• In Query set-user-secret-value, if c i = 1, B sets X i = P = αP, adds (ID i , −, X i , −, c i ) to L usk and aborts. VOLUME 7, 2019 • In Forgery, B can recover (τ * ,δ) and succeeds in solving the random instance (P, αP, α * P, . . . , α q s +1 P) from (q s + 1)-SDH problem if and only if c i = 1 and σ * is a valid signature provided by A II , where
. (13) Obviously, the case c i = 1 in Forgery will never happen because if c i = 1, the simulation has been terminated during Query set-user-side-secret. That is to say, the probability that B solves the (q s + 1)-SDH problem is zero.
Drawback 4: The system parameters should be initialized by the malicious-but-passive KGC (A II ) instead of the challenger B in the proof of Theorem 2.
In certificateless settings, KGC is responsible to initialize system parameters (params, msk). Hence, to mount an attack more easily in reality, the malicious-but-passive KGC might set some trapdoors without attracting the attention of users during the initialization phase. Obviously, passively accepting the system parameters from the challenger B cannot reflect the real attack power of A II .
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed a concrete public key replacement attack against the CLS scheme presented by Zhang et al. The attack indicated that the CLS scheme did not solve the IIoT data authenticity issue, because an attacker can easily impersonate other legitimate users to upload some false messages chosen by the attacker. We hope that our analysis can hope to improve the IIoT authentication in the future work. 
